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Driver for Contactless Payments 
 
 
Ronald Mann, Albert E. Cinelli Enterprise Professor of Law; 
Co-Director, Charles Evans Gerber Program in Transactional Studies, Columbia Law School 
 
 
Before the virus, my payments course discussed why so few of us paid for purchases with 
cash. Those conversations emphasized the inconvenience of carrying and using cash. When the 
course turned to payment cards, we discussed how the increasing speed of card-based 
transactions had made cards relatively more attractive to merchants. More broadly, my scholarly 
writings on the subject emphasized the societal downside of cash, the likely connection between 
crime and the dependence of an economy on cash transactions; that might be true because of 
the utility of cash either for sheltering criminal transactions or for avoiding taxation.1  
As a consumer, my primary experience with cash before the virus was standing in checkout 
lines observing the sluggish pace of cash transactions in front of me. Like so many things in our 
lives, the advent of the virus has changed the situation markedly. From the earliest days of 
infection, it has been far more unsettling to observe cash transactions knowing that the virus 
persists on paper and metal surfaces for days.2 
The dynamic that has driven the choices merchants offer in face-to-face retail transactions 
will change as well. Driven by the private exigencies of the retail environment, the last few 
decades have witnessed private mechanisms spreading cash-less retail transactions, 
predominantly card-based. In some countries, policymakers have supported that spread, 
reacting to the societal costs of a heavy reliance on cash by adopting rules that limit or even aim 
to eliminate the use of cash.3 More recently in this country, however, as a few businesses have 
                                               
1 See RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 102-05 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2006). 
2 See Neeltje van Doremalen, et al., Aerosol and surface stability of HCoV-19 (SARS-CoV-2) compared to SARS-CoV-1, 
New Engl. J. Med. (Mar. 17, 2020) (DOI: 10.1056/NEJMc2004973). 




refused to accept cash, local policymakers have pushed back, reasoning that a refusal to accept 
cash excludes less affluent purchasers (frequently unbanked) from fair access to commerce. 
Among others, Massachusetts,4 New Jersey,5 New York,6 Philadelphia,7 and San Francisco8 have 
banned cashless businesses. Indeed, the present Congress has considered two bills that would 
extend such a ban to the federal level.9 The likelihood that Amazon’s cashier-less stores (Amazon 
Go) would refuse cash payments has been a particular stimulant to those bills.10 
This essay makes two basic points about the effect of the virus on that mix of policy, legal, 
and institutional arrangements. First, policies fostering the use of cash in retail transactions are 
much harder to justify in the world of the virus, as it is harder to make those transactions safe for 
purchasers, cashiers, or the populace in general. Second, the slow pace of the shift from card-
based payments from swipe to chip, with the slower drift to phone-based payments, is more 
worrisome now, where fully contactless payments are safer for all involved than authentication 
either by swipe or chip. 
                                               
Virginia Harrison, This Could Be the First Country to Go Cashless, CNN Money (June 2, 2015), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/02/technology/cashless-society-denmark/; Abigail Adams, Norway’s Biggest Bank 
Calls for Country to Stop Using Cash, Int’l Bus. Times (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.ibtimes.com/norways-biggest-
bank-calls-country-stop-using-cash-2276140. 
4 See Ed Shanahan & Jeffery C. Mays, Cashless Businesses? City Council Says No, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 2020, at A21. 
5 See Aaron Moselle, US Ban Proposed on Cashless Businesses, Phila. Tribune, May 21, 2019, at 2B. 
6 See Shanahan & Mays, supra note 4. 
7 See Moselle, supra note 5; Christian Hetrick, Phila. Passes Ban on Cashless Stores, Phila. Inquirer,  Mar. 1, 2019, at 
A7. 
8 See Joshua Sabatini, SF Approves Ban on Cashless Stores, S.F. Examiner, May 7, 2019. 
9 Payment Choice Act of 2019, H.R. 2650 ((116th Cong., 1st Sess.); Cash Always Should Be Honored Act, H.R. 2630 
(116th Cong., 1st Sess.). 
10 See Sabatini, supra note 8; Robert Channick, Amazon Go Stores Will Give Accepting Cash a Go, Chi. Trib., Apr. 11, 




I. Cash Payments 
As mentioned above, the willingness of businesses to accept cash before the virus reflected 
the intersection of two conflicting trends: the creeping superiority of card-based payments from 
the merchant’s perspective and the increasing perception of policymakers that a refusal to accept 
cash disproportionately affects the large underbanked segment of the populace.11 The advent of 
the virus shifts the relevant considerations markedly. Now, cash payments are a danger not only 
to the individuals directly involved, but to society at large, as they spread the virus through the 
population. Nor is it a simple matter to sanitize those transactions, given the difficulty of 
removing the virus from paper, especially the cotton-and-linen weave of American currency.12 
Relatively speaking, the card-based payment is much safer, as the cashier typically need not 
touch the card and the cardholding purchaser can disinfect the card after any contact with a 
terminal at the point of sale. 
That new factor — the contagion of cash transactions — should change the reaction of local 
policymakers, who now should discourage cash payments and welcome the efforts of merchants 
to shift purchasers toward card-based payments. I doubt legislators will take seriously the notion 
of obligating merchants to refuse cash payments. Nor do I consider it realistic for the United 
States to move rapidly toward the eradication of the domestic currency. I do see, though, a few 
initiatives that might align the public and private interests to accelerate the trend away from 
cash. 
 
A. Public Policies 
The increasing societal cost of cash transactions justifies the use of policy levers to reduce 
the use of cash. The most obvious response would repeal the cash-obligating ordinances several 
                                               
11 See Shanahan & May, supra note 4 (noting that one in nine NYC households has no bank account); Sabatini, supra 
note 9; Hetrick, supra note 7. 
12 Jenny Surane et al., Is It Safe to Use Cash During Outbreak?, L.A. Times, Mar. 15, 2020, at C2.. Perhaps the problem 
would be different in the United Kingdom or one of the other countries that now issue currency made of plastic 
rather than paper. See Kirill Adamovich, Which Countries Use Polymer Banknotes, PaySpace Mag., Feb. 10, 2020, 
available at https://payspacemagazine.com/banks/which-countries-use-polymer-banknotes/  
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cities and States recently have passed. The most prominent of those probably is the New York 
City ordinance, which ironically came into effect this winter, just weeks before the virus spread 
through the city.13 If that recommendation seems obvious and overdetermined, consider the 
remarkable circumstances of the Delaware legislature, in which a legislator introduced a bill 
obligating businesses to accept cash in March of 2020, well after the pandemic had reached our 
shores.14 
The second proposed response reflects the relatively arbitrary choice between cash and 
card. For most of us, the choice between using cash or a card often reflects much less of a rational 
calculation about the costs and benefits of the competing payment devices than it does some 
combination of habit and rough rule of thumb.  Most suggest, for example, that they use cash for 
transactions below a certain threshold. In part, that habit might have developed because 
merchants often have prohibited purchasers from using payment cards for small transactions.15 
To the extent the choice for cash is a “soft” choice founded in habit rather than calculation, 
policymakers should be able to alter that choice for many transactions by raising awareness 
about the private and social costs of payments with cash: they are dangerous not only for the 
purchaser that pays with cash, but for society more broadly. In the same way that we accept the 
costs of social distancing as a group, even though third parties reap most of the benefits, 
appreciation of the risks of cash should lead to a cognizable shift away from cash and toward 
card-based payments.16 That suggests that public-service announcements and advertisements 
might substantially alter behavior. At the same time, to facilitate the use of cards in small 
                                               
13 The City Council passed the bill on January 23, 2020. See Shanahan & May, supra note 4. 
14 Sarah Gamard, Proposed Del. Bill Would Ban Stores from Refusing Cash, Wilmington News J., Mar. 11, 2020, at A3 
(discussing the introduction of Senate Bill 220 on March 10). 
15 See 15 U.S.C. 1693o-2(b)(3)(A) (preventing network rules that bar surcharge for accepting credit cards on 
transactions below ten dollars). 
16 I would expect the apparent riskiness to cash to drive a shift toward card-based payments even without 
government support.  It will be quite some time, though, before data would document such a shift. 
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transactions, Congress should reconsider the Dodd-Frank provision validating merchant 
payment-card minima.17 
It is harder to address the limited access of the unbanked to payment cards.18 It is beyond 
the scope of this essay to recapitulate the causes of that problem or the various solutions that 
other scholars have proposed. I should mention, though, the ready ability of stored-value cards 
as a mechanism for mitigating that problem. As I have written in previous work with Liran Haim, 
stored-value cards provide a simple way to get those without bank accounts into the mainstream 
of modern payments. As we explain, stored-value cards already are used successfully for all 
federal payments to unbanked individuals. They also are commonly used for recurring salary 
payments to the unbanked.19 Rolling out similar programs at the state and local level should put 
an even larger share of the populace in a position to choose card-based payments over cash. 
 
B. Merchant Initiatives 
Public policy and legislation has played only a minor role in the shift over the last half 
century from cash to payment card at the point of sale. Rather, the dominant force driving that 
shift was the relative desirability of those transactions for merchants and purchasers. Hence, 
initiatives that accelerate that shift are at least as likely to come from merchants as they are to 
come from legislators.  
One key point is the likely alignment of the public and private interests in sanitizing retail 
payment transactions. Merchants understand that our choices among competing retailers rest in 
part on our perception about the safety of those retailers. Retailers that mandate social 
distancing and offer conspicuous disinfection of their stores are more attractive than those that 
do not. The same will be increasingly true for payments, as purchasers gain awareness of the 
relative risk of cash payments as opposed to card-based payments. A few likely merchant 
responses come to mind. 
                                               
17 See supra note 15. 
18 See, e.g., Shanahan & May, supra note 4. 
19 Putting Stored Value Cards in Their Place, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 989 (2014). 
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The first is softer, parallel to the informational response suggested above: when purchasers 
offer to pay with cash, cashiers could suggest that they pay instead with a card.20 That would 
parallel the common efforts of merchants in recent decades to shift payments from credit cards 
to debit cards. In this context, though, the savings would come not from decreased out-of-pocket 
costs, but rather from the safety to the store’s own employees (who would touch the currency 
of fewer purchasers) and from the increased perception of the store’s safety (as customers less 
commonly observe contagion-preferent cash transactions). 
A second initiative, parallel to retailer segregation of checkout lines by payment type, would 
be to funnel all cash payments to separate “cash-only” payment lines. That would reassure card-
using purchasers that they could pass through a checkout line that had not been infected with 
currency-borne virus. Similarly, it would support more careful disinfectant procedures for the 
cash-only transactions. It might be easier for a merchant to more rigorously sanitize the checkout 
station and cash drawer after each transaction involving the receipt or distribution of cash if the 
cost of slowing the pace of transactions was borne largely by the purchasers making the relatively 
risky choice to pay with currency. 
 
II. Card-Based Payments 
It is only a first step to support the shift from cash payments (with their inherent contact) 
to card-based payments (at least potentially contactless). Concerns about contagion create a new 
fault line in the ongoing deployment of advancing technologies for card-based payments. 
Specifically, where the advances of the last few decades have been driven by concerns about 
enhancing security, the circumstances the industry now confronts suggest an entirely new 
motivation for accelerating the use of advancing technologies. 
To explain, the most important story of the century to date has been the shift away from 
the authentication of retail card transactions by a swipe of a magnetic strip on the back of the 
card. The basic problem with swipe-dependent authentication always has been that malfeasors 
easily could produce forged cards that readily could be used to conduct transactions at retail 
                                               
20 This is already happening. See Surane et al., supra note 12 (discussing Dick’s Drive-in in Seattle). 
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stores without detection by conventional payment terminals. Most of the world shifted to chip-
laden cards early in the century, implementing an encryption system that is impervious to 
forgery, at least under current technological conditions. The United States, though, did not shift 
to that technology until 2015. That technology is now widely deployed in retail establishments in 
the United States, as substantially all issuers of credit and debit cards have replaced stripe-
bearing cards with chip-laden cards, and the great majority of retail merchants now use terminals 
that interrogate the chip to validate the authenticity of the card.21 
A few years later, Apple released the Apple Pay application on its cellphones, subsequently 
mirrored by Android Pay and Samsung Pay for phones from other manufacturers. That 
technology essentially mimics the authentication of the chip cards so that transactions conducted 
by any of the phone-pay applications are as secure as transactions conducted with chip cards 
(assuming that the holder of the phone is an authorized user of the card).  
The deployment of those technologies left a wide gap in retail authentication regimes 
between the great majority of retail commerce (in which transactions are secure - authenticated 
by a chip or phone) and those lingering pockets of retail commerce at which terminals rely on a 
swipe as opposed to the chip (at this point, most of those transactions occur at gasoline stations). 
But the advent of the virus brings a different dichotomy, between the transactions in which the 
card contacts the payment terminal (those in which a card is swiped or a chip inserted) and the 
phone-based transactions that are wholly contactless. In the former case, the card necessarily 
contacts a terminal that has contacted numerous previous cards, each of them a plastic surface 
possibly carrying the virus. In the latter case, the purchaser need not contact any surface at all to 
complete the payment transaction.22 The new milieu, then, is one in which cardholding 
purchasers, and thus the merchants that wish to attract them, have a strong incentive to ramp 
up their acceptance of phone-based payment applications. 
                                               
21 See, e.g., MRONALD J. MANN PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 8-9 (7th ed. 2020); Visa Chip Card 
Update (Dec. 2018), available at 
 https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/regional/na/us/visa-everywhere/documents/emv-chip-infographic-q4.pdf. 
22 I do not consider the intermediate step of contactless “tap-and-pay” transactions, which are available at a much 
larger group of merchants than phone-pay transactions. In my experience, it is not routinely practicable to conduct 
those transactions without the surface of the card firmly contacting the terminal. 
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To date, the use and acceptance of those applications has increased incrementally.23 The 
relatively limited use of those applications by consumers has limited the incentives of merchants 
to expend the resources to upgrade their payment terminals to accept the phone-based 
applications. The discussion above suggests that the increased consumer awareness of the 
relative safety of wholly contactless payment transactions might change both sides of that 
dynamic.  As cardholding purchasers seek to avoid contact with objects in the retail 
establishments that they patronize, they should increase the frequency with which they use 
those applications. Similarly, as merchants compete to attract customers by enhancing the 
apparent safety of their establishments, they will have an increased incentive to be seen to 
embrace those applications as the safest possible instrumentalities of payment. 
 
III. Conclusion 
The pressure for contactless payments well might affect areas other than the two I 
emphasize above. Among other things, it might accelerate the decline of check usage,   interpose 
another obstacle to merchant preference for PIN-based authentication of payment-card 
transactions, or spur more restaurant owners to adopt European-style pay-at-the-table card 
terminals. It is enough for this short piece if I have illustrated a few of the most important changes 
it might support. 
                                               
23 See, e.g., Chance Miller, Apple Pay Usage Continues to Lag in the United States, New Data Suggests, 9to5Mac, 
Aug. 29, 2019, available at https://9to5mac.com/2019/08/29/apple-pay-adoption-united-states/. 
